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While urban India has been a popular subject of scholarly analysis for 
decades, the majority of that attention has been focused on its major 
cities. Borderland City in New India: Frontier to Gateway instead explores 
contemporary urban life in a smaller city located in India’s Northeast 
borderland at a time of dramatic change, showing how this city has been 
profoundly affected by armed conflict, militarism, displacement, interethnic 
tensions, and the expansion of neoliberal capitalism.
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‘Through a brilliant spatial ethnography, McDuie-Ra takes us inside this 
fraught space, outlining the dilemmas and possibilities of everyday life, the 
contradictions and erosions of rule, and the confused transition from unruly 
frontier to gateway city. He offers a theoretically nuanced and empirically 
dynamic study of urbanization in one of India’s most critical yet little-
understood borderlands.’
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‘With a subtle sense of humour, and fine sensibility to scale, McDuie-Ra, 
analyses Imphal’s transformation from an unruly frontier town to a market 
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and soldiers, nurses and public intellectuals, celebrities and ‘ordinary folk’ all 
aspire to make the most of the contingency of change.’
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1 Introduction
On the far eastern edge of India, just 100 kilometres by road from Myanmar, 
is Imphal, the capital of Manipur; a former kingdom controversially merged 
into the Indian Union in 1949 and subject to various separatist and intereth-
nic conflicts ever since. With a population of half a million, Imphal city sits 
in the Imphal valley, a depression within the Patkai range at an elevation of 
770 meters surrounded by higher, steeper hills that form the majority of the 
land in the state. Among the semi-completed residential buildings, military 
check posts and headquarters, government buildings sitting behind security 
bunkers, and markets teeming with goods from across the border are the 
remains of Imphal’s cinema halls. On Bir Tikendrajit Road, one the Imphal’s 
busiest streets, sits Rupmahal – a theatre built in 1948 and the onetime heart 
of Imphal’s politically charged theatre scene (see Somorendra, 2000) and 
later a cinema. Like so many other patches of pavement along Bir Tikendrajit 
Road, including the nearby public library, the courtyard of Rupmahal hosts 
a second-hand clothes market. Vendors have strung bamboo poles hanging 
shirts and coats between concrete pillars, exterior walls, and on protruding 
steel rods. On plastic sheets arranged on the ground are piles of pants and 
T-shirts. The clothes have labels and logos in Chinese, Korean and Thai. 
Inside the dark lobby of the theatre is an old ticket window for Imphal 
Talkies, the cinema that ran from of Rupmahal for several decades (and 
now the name of one Manipur’s best-known rock bands). The cinema has 
not operated since the early 2000s when underground groups imposed a 
ban on Hindi language in Manipur, reducing the number of f ilms available 
to show. This, combined with mounting insecurity for residents since the 
1990s, killed off Imphal nightlife (Akoijam, 2010). The place appears deserted 
but behind the heavy door of the theatre is a troupe of actors rehearsing 
for an afternoon performance under a few light bulbs dangling from the 
roof. The cinema is gone, but in its place the theatre has been resurrected.
Around the city the scene is repeated. At Friends’ Mini cinema in Paona 
Bazaar the grand stairway that would have once led up into a mezzanine 
foyer is lined with small shops, built on improvised timber platforms 
balanced on the stairs and propped up with cinder blocks, selling new 
clothes that have come from the border markets. In the upper foyer four 
men are playing table tennis by the entrance to the main cinema hall in 
the complex. One of them agrees to open up the locked door for me. All 
of the seats have been removed and the f loor is taken up by orderly rows 
of second-hand clothing in bales under the soaring ceiling. The pink and 
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sky-blue stucco ceiling remains, though it has faded. Light comes instead 
from bulbs dangling from rope tied the length of the hall and through large 
holes in the wall where air vents have been removed to let in shards of 
sunlight (and pigeons). One of the caretakers explains that they look after 
stock for several merchants in the surrounding area. Every now and again 
the merchants send porters to carry off a bale from their massive inventory, 
all of which are marked with a name and a number hand-written on the side.
Perhaps most poignant of all the old cinemas is Shanker Talkies in 
Lamphelpat, a locality in the west of the city. In a yellow and red cube 
building dating from the late 1970s, Shanker Talkies too has a once-grand 
walkway complete with scenes from the Khamba-Thoibi, a Manipuri folk-
tale, above the landings and the long-disused kiosk. Old f ilm posters peel off 
the walls and debris gathers on the marble f loor. Shanker Talkies was built 
as a twin theatre and the larger theatre is still used occasionally for premiere 
screenings of Manipuri f ilms – a thriving industry also aided by the decline 
in Hindi cinema – though following their premiere local f ilms are mostly 
shown in smaller video halls and in people’s homes on laptops and DVD 
players. When I visited Shanker Talkies the door to the smaller theatre was 
open. Inside it was dark – the only light coming through removed sections of 
wall near the ceiling. On the stage was a drum-kit and microphones. In the 
aisles a man paced up and down rehearsing a sermon. Others walked back 
and forth praying. A young man, Chao-toiba, approached and welcomed me 
to the Spirit of Faith Church Imphal, an evangelical sect for recent Meitei 
converts to Christianity running services in the old cinema for want of a 
permanent space. He asked that I stay for their service, stressing that I would 
enjoy listening to their pastor who was trained in Ukhrul – a hill area right 
on the border with Myanmar.
Afterwards in the vacant lot outside where shops once stood selling 
food and locally made shoes and clothes to cinema patrons, and where 
playing cards and small brown medicine bottles now lay scattered on the 
ground, Shanker Talkies stood against the bright midday sky as a tempting 
metaphor for Manipur’s recent history. The ban on Hindi language had 
helped the decline of cinemas in Imphal. Chronic insecurity and high levels 
of violence certainly played a role as well. Ironically, the ban on Hindi 
was enforced and planned by Meitei ethno-nationalist groups in a bid to 
preserve Meitei language and culture. Yet a decade and a half later within 
an old cinema run-down by the ban, a group of Meiteis were running an 
evangelical church welcoming new converts to Christianity: Indian cultural 
domination may have been prevented but other ‘external’ inf luences were 
certainly visible in social life. Indeed if the end of Hindi cinema suggests a 
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kind of closing off of Manipur to India in the 2000s, a turning away, then 
the inf lux of second-hand clothes that now f ill the very same buildings 
originating from East Asia, perhaps via other stops, suggests an opening to 
the rest of Asia – all played out on the urban landscape. Yet among all this 
direction changing Rupmahal is still staging Manipuri plays, suggesting 
perhaps that indigenous culture can persevere in the midst of these larger 
dynamics. Of course the metaphor is partial, just one thread in a complex 
story. But a compelling thread nonetheless.
Imphal was classif ied ‘disturbed’ by the Indian Government from 1980-
2004. Imphal’s residents have been subject to the excesses of extraordinary 
laws and military occupation, incoming f lows of refugees, separatist 
insurgencies and armed extortion, and mostly unsuccessful attempts at 
economic development. The city exemplif ies what Dunn and Cons call a 
sensitive space, where people are subject to multiple ‘interwoven projects, 
logics, goals and anxieties of rule operating at once’ (2014: 102). Despite 
decades of violence, extraordinary laws, poor employment prospects, and 
civic dysfunction, Imphal continues to grow. Migrants arrive from rural 
Manipur, from neighbouring border polities, from across the borders with 
Bangladesh and Myanmar, and – controversially – from other parts of India 
and Nepal. At the same time a large Manipuri diaspora has formed, sending 
back remittances to relatives and later returning to settle in Imphal.
This book is an exploration of belonging, exclusion, and agency in Imphal 
at a time when prevailing conf igurations of power in the city, honed through 
decades of extraordinary laws and dysfunctional civilian politics, are being 
met by the forces of capital let loose by the transformation of the borderland 
from a frontier to a corridor. My argument has two parts. First, I argue 
that within the city authority is fragmented into microsites of contention 
where state, quasi-state (military and paramilitary) and non-state actors 
seek to control space. This situation evokes Lund’s notion of fragmented 
sovereignty, namely that in ‘post-colonial political landscapes, governance 
is not the preserve of governments. A wider variety of institutional actors 
are at play in this enterprise, often using the language and idioms of state’ 
(2011: 887). Everyday acts by residents such as protest, creating memorials, 
marking territory, and the demarcation of neighbourhoods challenge the 
spatial practices of those in control, or seemingly in control. These acts are 
attempts to make place, to establish and maintain a sense of belonging. 
However, I posit that belonging also entails exclusion of others, and in 
Imphal this takes place along two main fault lines: between ethnic com-
munities and between Manipuris and migrants from outside the state. 
Imphal is the battleground upon which these claims for place are fought. 
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I am interested in how these battles play out in, and also shape, the urban 
landscape itself. As discussed further below, the conceptual framework of 
sensitive space (Dunn and Cons, 2014) and fragmented sovereignty (Lund, 
2011) – approached with cognisance of Lefebvre’s (1991) dialectical approach 
to the production of space – illuminates the ways Imphal is controlled 
and the ways this control is challenged from below by people in search 
of belonging and trying to make do. Making do, what Pine refers to as 
‘creative tactics for seizing opportunities and negotiating risk’ (2012: 10), 
takes place in a city where the enablers of everyday life such as mobility, 
safety, security, property rights, cash loans, sanitation, and employment 
are promised and provided by various actors at various times in different 
parts of the city. So too are the threats to everyday life such violence, 
extortion, and evictions among others. This argument is explored in part 
one of the book.
Having established the contours of the frontier city and the ways residents 
navigate them, part two explores its nascent transformation into a gateway 
city. Not only is the borderland seen as a corridor to new markets, it is seen as 
a new market itself and subject to various policies aimed at maximising its 
‘potential’. The liberalisation of a militarised city long-dominated by a heavy 
state presence and security-driven governance brings forth my second 
main argument. Off icial discourse of the Indian Government and various 
policy analysts and think tanks envisages a future borderland where goods, 
people, and production move in and out of the gateway city. Yet connectivity 
operates very differently when viewed from below. Various organised and ad 
hoc actions exploit new mobilities and new vulnerabilities to make claims 
for recognition of Manipuri sovereignty, to challenge the ways space is 
controlled on the streets, and to make demands on the Manipur and Indian 
Governments for greater territorial autonomy – for example. I argue that 
while connectivity brings Imphal further under the control of the Indian 
state and opens the city to Indian and transnational capital – a sensitive 
development in a polity where resistance to India has underpinned political 
and economic life for the last sixty years – connectivity also provides new 
opportunities to advance claims for place, belonging, and territory.
Further, Imphal’s booming private health and education sector are 
reshaping the landscape of the city. The so-called ‘health city’ and ‘educa-
tion city’ are seemingly at odds with the picture of the city painted in 
part one; violent, dysfunctional, divided. However, in keeping with the 
second point of argument, they also demonstrate alternative imaginings of 
connectivity: the desire for local entrepreneurs engaged in licit and illicit 
livelihoods to invest in making Imphal a health hub for the borderland 
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and the extraordinary demand for private education to enable further 
study in other parts of India and provide a ticket out. These booms have 
stretched the boundaries of the city generating new struggles over place in 
the peri-urban fringe. They are also examples of endogenous liberalisation 
that depend, in part, on the dysfunctional state apparatus and the power of 
non-state actors. In other words it is doubtful whether such a boom would 
be possible without the ‘transgression and erosion’ (Dunn and Cons, 2014: 
104) of sovereign power that characterises life in Imphal; a situation likely 
found in other militarised borderlands with various degrees of similarity 
and difference. Finally, at least in the case of the health sector, endogenous 
liberalisation is an expression of self-suff iciency for a community with 
limited mechanisms to enact autonomy and for whom existing institutional 
structures have disappointed.
Disturbed City, Sensitive Space
Manipur is part of the subnational region known as Northeast India, an 
administrative term of the Indian Government applied to diverse geo-
graphic region consisting of eight federal states: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura as well as 
Image 1.1  Shanker Talkies, Lamphelpat
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a number of autonomous territories. With the exception of Sikkim all of 
these states have had at least some of their territory declared a ‘disturbed 
area’ in the last six decades. A disturbed area is any designated territory 
within the current (though disputed) borders of India where extraordinary 
laws can be enacted. Only the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Governor 
of the respective state can declare an area disturbed (Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 1958/1998, Section 3). In India the Governor is a non-elected posi-
tion appointed by the President. In the Northeast the appointee is usually 
a former member of the military (Baruah, 2005). Designating an area as 
disturbed must be reviewed periodically every six months – yet there is no 
limit on the renewal of disturbed status, and some areas of the borderland 
have been declared disturbed continuously for decades. Once declared the 
designation is not open to judicial review and state and local governments 
can do little to challenge its imposition.
Disturbed status produces a disturbing reality. It enables the Armed 
Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 (AFSPA) to operate. The AFSPA permits 
any member of the Indian Armed Forces and Paramilitary (armed forces 
hereafter) to f ire ‘even to the causing of death’ upon individuals acting in 
contravention of any law or order, carrying weapons (or anything capable 
of being used as a weapon) or assembling in a group of f ive or more people. 
Under the AFSPA, suspected persons can be detained for 24 hours, with 
unlimited extensions/renewals, and members of the armed forces are per-
mitted to enter any premises without a warrant; collapsing the distinction 
between public and private space. Most signif icantly, the AFSPA provides 
legal protection (in the form of both de facto and de jure impunity) for 
members of the armed forces operating in a disturbed area (Mathur, 2012).
Imphal was declared disturbed in 1980. Disturbed status was lifted from 
the Imphal valley, including Imphal city, in 2004 following mass protests 
after the rape and murder of a Manipuri woman, Thangjam Manorama Devi, 
by members of the Assam Rifles paramilitary, including a bold nude protest 
by members of the Meira Paibis women’s association (Bora, 2010; Gaikwad, 
2009; Misri, 2011). Yet the legacy of disturbed city status is powerful. A 
decade on the armed forces still occupy the city, still administer various 
public buildings, and still have a major influence on political and social life. 
Further, although the Manipur Government has its own police forces that 
are not legally bound by the AFSPA they operate within the same culture 
of impunity and are responsible for much of the contemporary violence in 
Imphal. As an indication of the scale of rights abuses under AFSPA, 1528 
cases of ‘fake encounter’, the term used for the murder of a civilian by the 
military that is then justif ied by branding the deceased an insurgent, were 
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currently awaiting hearing in the Supreme Court as of June 2014 (Imphal 
Free Press, 2014). A staggering number for a population of 2.6 million and 
keeping in mind that this f igure represents only fake encounters, not rape, 
murder without fake encounter, and disappearances. This number only 
represents the incidents that have been f iled as cases. Many relatives of 
those killed do not take cases forward over fear that they will face retribu-
tion, that other family members will be investigated, or because they simply 
have no faith that it will do any good.
Many of these killings took place before 2004, but there is little to indicate 
that levels of violence or insecurity have been signif icantly reduced by the 
lifting of disturbed status from the city, especially when it is still in place 
in other districts of the state and given the armed forces have not left the 
city. Further the Manipur police and various local security forces do not 
operate under the auspices of AFSPA, thus the lifting of disturbed status 
does little to affect their operations. Imphal may no longer be off icially 
disturbed, yet life on the ground continues to be disturbing; subject to 
the same culture of violence and impunity that has characterised the city 
since the 1980s (McDuie-Ra, 2012b). Violence has become unremarkable 
over time, ref lecting Sidaway’s notion of ‘banal geopolitics’ (2001) wherein 
violence is framed as ‘unexceptional’ – if at all – in the face of on-going 
and oft-repeated arguments about the inviolability of Indian territorial 
sovereignty on the one hand and the savagery of anti-national rebellion on 
the other (see also Abraham, 2014).
The activities of the various underground groups further produce the 
disturbing reality of everyday life. Estimates of the number of underground 
groups operating in Manipur tend to hover in the 30s (SATP, 2014a; IDSA, 
2014) though the propensity of state agencies and right-wing think tanks to 
use labels like ‘terrorist’ or ‘insurgent’ to describe underground groups can 
be misleading. Some groups are organised armed groups f ighting for seces-
sion from India, for changes to existing federal state boundaries, for territo-
rial autonomy within Manipur, and for changes to ethnically determined 
aff irmative action categories. Many of these groups have ‘above ground’ 
political parties, media outlets, and aff iliated NGOs that engage with the 
government and the military on various issues – usually outside formal 
politics. Some are distant offshoots or loose aff iliates of these organised 
groups or have no relationship to them. Some are closer to organised crime 
networks that engage in illegal activities like smuggling, traff icking, kidnap-
ping, and extortion but also in the murky world of Imphal’s infrastructure 
development, contracting, racketeering, and – increasingly – social services. 
They are able to exercise control over certain spaces within the city and 
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inf luence mobility, livelihoods, and security in negative and positive ways 
depending on circumstances. They protect as well as threaten, and for many 
residents this makes them very similar to the armed forces or the police.
The territorial politics of the three main ethnic groups in Manipur, 
vestiges of colonial anthropology and systems of rule: the valley-dwelling 
Meitei and hill-dwelling Naga and Kuki tribal communities exacerbate 
tensions in the city. Violent encounters between Naga and Kuki commu-
nities ruptured life in the hill areas through the 1990s leading many of 
those affected, or simply scared, to f lee to Imphal. In the 2000s tensions 
between the Meitei community and both hill communities heightened 
the hostility of interethnic tensions, culminating in three epochal mo-
ments. First, the Meitei protests against the Naga ceasef ire and possible 
redrawing of Manipur’s boundaries in 2001 that led to security forces killing 
18 Meitei protestors. Those killed were subsequently made martyrs and 
have a permanent memorial site in Imphal (Kekrupat) and an annual day 
of mourning – a constant reminder of the hill-valley tensions. Second, 
in late 2010 the Mao Gate incident provoked hostilities between Nagas 
in the hills and the Meitei community of the valley when the Manipur 
Government tried to block the leader of the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the main Naga independence organisa-
tion, Thuingaleng Muivah, from entering the state. Nagas protested in the 
hills, blocking the highways into Imphal and cutting the city off for almost 
three months. Third, Kuki communities pushing for an autonomous hill 
district within Manipur staged a blockade of Imphal in 2011 that went for 
even longer. Life during the blockades is trying. Shortages, price hikes, 
closed schools, off ices, shops, and deep community tensions keep many 
people off the streets.
In Imphal, the condition of living in a disturbed city has an undeniable 
legacy. Yet the disturbed city is more than a categorisation or description 
of a period. It is a metaphor for the ruptures to everyday life experienced in 
the borderland during the brutal chapters of state-making that have taken 
place prior to and following Indian Independence in 1947. Yet disturbed 
also gives a sense of continued affect: of a sub- or semi-conscious state of 
being and acting birthed in moments of rupture yet continuing long after 
(see Seigworth and Gregg, 2010).
Disturbed status and its attendant extraordinary laws raise the ques-
tion of how such conditions can exist in the world’s largest democracy? 
Agamben’s (2005) reworking of Schmidt’s state of exception has proved 
very attractive to scholars seeking to understand the existence and persis-
tence of extraordinary laws in Manipur and other parts of the borderland 
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(Basavapatna, 2012; Chakravarti, 2010; Gaikwad, 2009; Kshetrimayum, 2009; 
Sundar, 2011). Authors utilising Agamben to frame the Northeast – even in 
passing – argue that extraordinary laws have been able to function in the 
region for so long because the region itself is an exceptional zone, disloyal, 
unstable, and violent; where the exception to the law initially created under 
conditions of crisis has become the norm (Agamben, 1998: 166). This appears 
to perfectly describe disturbed areas and the persistence of AFSPA. For 
example, in referring to AFSPA Vajpeyi writes that Manipur should ‘not be 
thought of only as a zone of exception, but as a contradiction so extreme 
that it undoes the totality in which it is embedded, and breaks it down into 
distinct and mutually opposed regimes: a democracy and a non-democracy; 
two nations: India and not-India’ (2009: 36). She goes on to argue ‘if the 
AFSPA is the ban under which the sovereign power of the Indian state 
has placed all of the Northeast, then the exception to the rule of law that 
is spatialised in the Northeast should be thought of as a camp’. The camp 
being what Agamben calls ‘the fundamental bio-political paradigm of the 
West’ and where subject populations are stripped of their rights and agency 
(1998: 181). Agamben’s concept of ‘bare life’ is also used to refer to people 
living under AFSPA; a population in a permanent state of exception without 
political or legal rights, or even subjectivity, at the whim of sovereign power 
(see Kshetrimayum, 2009; Gaikwad, 2009; Vajpeyi, 2009). Political agency is 
restrained, though when it does occur requires desperate and spectacular 
gestures, such as the naked protests by members of the Meira Paibis in 
Imphal in 2004, discussed in chapter 3, analysed brilliantly by Baishya 
(2010).
While seductive and certainly evocative, the popularity of Agamben for 
understanding the borderland, Manipur, and Imphal is not only becoming 
formulaic, it is redirecting scholarly enquiry away from the multiple forms of 
sovereign power that operate, the agency of different actors and individuals 
in the region, and the complex and ambiguous nature of citizenship in 
the borderland. Manipur is not a camp. This is not to say sovereign power 
cannot take away life with little or no consequences; this is true. And while 
evoking exceptionalism marks the gravity of abuses of sovereign power in 
Imphal by state and quasi-state actors, their power is not absolute, they 
are highly sensitive as to how they are portrayed, and they are engaged 
in contentious struggles to control of the city – some of which they lose. 
While I am not antithetical to the framing of Indian power in relation to 
its ethnic minority borderlands in this way myself, at least at a certain level 
(McDuie-Ra, 2009a, 2012a), such an approach calls forth a singular coherent 
sovereignty that is diff icult to locate on the ground. Further it constructs 
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Manipur as a passive space, a depoliticized landscape of misery with few 
agents or acts of def iance, let alone endogenous sources of power. It erases 
almost all of the complexity and contradiction of life in Manipur. Further 
it stops short of unravelling this complexity to see whether exceptionalism 
does indeed shape everyday life – a necessary task for ethnographers.
As Baishya argues with regard to the burgeoning use of Agamben in 
works on the Northeast borderland: ‘By privileging the postcolonial state 
as the singular topos of sovereignty, and correspondingly, the overarch-
ing entity that spatialises the state of exception, commentators … often 
downplay the fractured nature with which governmentality is wielded and 
its effects experienced or endured in the region … [and] leads to a restricted 
vocabulary for understanding modes of sovereign governmentality, states 
of dispossession and its aftermaths’ (2015: 606-607).
The state of exception gives an interesting starting point but reveals little 
of what constitutes social and political life within the borderland, and in the 
case here, in Imphal. Given the power of state, quasi-state, and non-state 
actors in controlling space in Imphal it is crucial to move beyond its limita-
tions. It is here that the concept of ‘sensitive space’ developed by Dunn and 
Cons (2014) serves as a useful starting point for understanding power and 
belonging in Imphal. Sensitive spaces are notable ‘for the multiple forms 
of power that abound, compete and overlap there and the forms of anxiety 
that they provoke for both those who are governed and those who seek to 
govern’ (2014: 95). Anxiety is certainly characteristic of Imphal, where the 
desire for control by certain actors is often more identif iable than actual 
control of space.
The concept identif ies multiple forms of power in contested spaces and 
the ways people navigate and challenge these in their everyday life (2014: 
100-101). And in doing so people are ‘constantly forced to transgress the 
bounds of projects, they erode specif ic sovereign projects – the techniques 
of sovereign power – and the claims to sovereign authority that they mark’ 
(2014: 102). This constant erosion produces anxiety for actors seeking to 
govern sensitive space as it exposes their tenuous hold on territories they 
claim. Thus agency is not only about making do, but the ways that making 
do can expose the limits of control; especially when control emanates from 
multiple, often overlapping and/or competing sources. This in turn leads to 
newer attempts to control. In this kind of space rule by chance – aleatory 
sovereignty – typif ies power in a constantly shifting landscape.
As Lund has argued in his work on public authority in Africa, social life 
is ‘constantly (re-)produced and sanctioned, not necessarily by one single 
body of “state”, but by a variety of institutions which, in doing so, assume 
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public authority and some character of the state’ (2006: 688). Legitimacy is 
a crucial part of establishing authority, and what is regarded as legitimate 
varies within different spatial and social contexts. Further, legitimacy shifts 
over time and in relation to the actors themselves and issues on which 
legitimate authority is sought; it is established through conflict and negotia-
tion (2006: 693). Lund goes on to argue that a key component of legitimising 
public authority is territorialisation through ‘delimitation and assertion 
of control’ over a geographic area (2006: 695). This is a key characteristic 
of the disturbed city, which is composed of multiple microsites of control 
and contention.
Frontiers to Corridors
The legacy of the disturbed city is lived through a contemporary moment 
of dual connectivity. On the one hand it is becoming better connected to 
Myanmar and onto Southeast Asia as part of the oft mentioned but rarely 
qualif ied ‘Look East Policy’ of the Indian Government (see Haokip, 2015). 
Imphal has become a staging post for all kinds of transnational ventures 
from highways to trade fairs to car rallies. No longer the end of the road, 
India’s recalcitrant frontier plagued by rebellion and deprivation, Imphal 
is now very much on the road, metaphorically and materially speaking, 
linking South and Southeast Asia. Imphal is imagined as part of a zone 
of ‘potential’, where the irresistible force of India’s rising power meets the 
seemingly unbound economic might of Southeast Asia and China – where 
anything and everything is produced and purchased. Better access to 
markets, somewhat mystically imagined, is equated to peace, opportunity, 
and development. Connectivity to the east has garnered a great deal of 
attention among journalists, scholars, politicians, and entrepreneurs in 
Delhi and in the borderland itself. It can be seen as a more natural f it; the 
Tibeto-Burman, Tai and Mon-Khmer inhabitants of the frontier becoming 
more formally linked with their co-ethnics across the international border 
(a problematic claim to be sure, but one made with startling regularity). Yet 
there has been signif icantly less attention given to the ways connectivity 
and the opening up of the frontier has necessitated greater connection 
between the borderland and the rest of India.
The f low of goods, people, and capital into Imphal does not just come 
from across the international border but from mainland India as well: 
outward connectivity to other parts of Asia and inward connectivity to the 
rest of India. The Indian state has increased its presence in the borderland 
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for the last f ive decades through the military and paramilitary facilitated 
by categories like disturbed, by creating federal state units and attendant 
bureaucracies – made up of persons indigenous to the borderland and 
migrants from other parts of India, through party politics, and through 
objects that mark the landscape as Indian territory – statues of Gandhi, 
State Bank of India branches, Assam Oil and Bharat Petroleum fuel pumps, 
and distance markers from the Border Roads Association. In recent years 
new layers of ‘India’ have been added to the landscape of the borderland; 
though this is not the ‘old’ India of the military and the bureaucracy, but the 
‘new’ India of the market. The arrival of new India is even more fascinating 
in Imphal where ‘old’ India never took hold and has been strongly resisted 
for decades.
Dual connectivity is transforming Northeast India in ways that resemble 
transformations taking place in borderlands across Asia, the transformation 
from frontiers to corridors. Transnational connectivity promises railways, 
highways, and visa-free regimes. It promises easier commerce to boost the 
economies of rural and provincial areas. These connections pass through 
borderlands. Not only do they connect borderlands and their residents 
across borders but also they connect them to heartlands within contempo-
rary state boundaries. Better-quality infrastructure brings state authority 
right up the very edge of territories claimed. Yet it is not just the agencies of 
the state that gain access to the borderlands through greater connectivity. 
Borderlands become more attractive markets with more consumers and 
lower costs of transportation. Connectivity also reduces the costs of extrac-
tion from borderlands. Thus resources like coal, timber, animal and plant 
life are no longer as risky and expensive to extract – especially for state 
agencies and their private partners who can operate with the protection 
of the military. And it provides a faster, cheaper, and often safer route for 
borderland residents to migrate out of frontier to work in the heartlands. 
In the process of enabling flows of goods, capital, and people across borders 
transnational connectivity can bring borderlands more f irmly into the 
national fold.
I am very wary of over-determining connectivity as a transformative fac-
tor in the economic, social, and political life of Imphal. Indeed not everything 
that happens in Imphal is a result of connectivity or a reaction to it. Rather, 
I view connectivity as characteristic of the present conjuncture; it captures 
the moment wherein borderlands are subject to particular experiments in 
state-making based on increasing accessibility for the private sector and 
increasing the capacity for cross-border movement – signif icant shifts from 
the security and state-led development approach that has characterised 
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the decades since independence. Borderlands are fascinating vantage 
points from which to study national and transnational transformations. 
There has been a voluminous amount of literature analysing the impacts 
of neoliberalism (usually referred to as liberalisation in the Indian context) 
and globalisation in India, which will be discussed in chapter 5. While this 
literature accounts for changes at the national and the subnational levels, 
there is limited investigation into the way these changes affect volatile 
territories at the very edge of the Indian state.
The borderland city is where these transformations are concentrated 
and contested, where the conjuncture is most intense. This makes Imphal 
such an appealing site. Connectivity has re-situated Imphal within India 
and as a conduit for f lows beyond India. It is also where local territorial 
imaginations are enacted producing localised tensions and conf licts. In 
studying a city like Imphal there is an opportunity to conceptualise the 
borderland city as a particular urban environment, sensitive urban space if 
you will, and also capture the scholarly turn towards research on vernacular 
urbanism and small cities.
Bell and Jayne note that ‘in developing countries two-thirds of urban 
residents live in places of less than 1 million people’ (2009: 689). They argue 
that ‘if the role and nature of small urbanity is to be more fully understood, 
a number of “imaginative leaps” must be taken by theorists currently hung 
up on the notion that globalisation of the city means globalisation of the 
metropolis’ (2009: 690). Bunnell and Maringanti (2010) refer to this turn in 
scholarship as moving beyond ‘Metrocentricity’. Moving beyond mega-cities 
also calls for more engaged ethnographic work, work that cannot be done 
from afar with secondary data (2010: 417). It is hard, slow work, but work 
that lends itself to ethnographic approaches and ‘conceptual flexibility and 
a willingness to engage with plural traditions’ (2010: 418).
This is a signif icant turn in Asia, especially South Asia, where small 
cities have received less attention from scholars, yet as Denis et al. (2012) 
demonstrate in the case of India, small, rapidly growing urban settlements 
are vital sites for understanding development and change. However, they 
remain almost completely obscured by the focus on mega-cities. In South 
Asia the small city is a hard sell. The mega-city dominates research in a 
number of disciplines, alongside work on the village or the rural region. 
Work on migration bridges the two, yet the small city remains marooned 
in between.
Imphal is also a borderland city shaped by its location on the periphery 
of the Indian state close to international borders. There is now a discern-
able ‘next generation’ of borderlands scholarship that is moving beyond 
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advocating for the importance of borderlands towards locating borders 
within and outside contemporary nation-states and as part of globalised 
f lows of people, goods and capital and innovative ways of reading these 
f lows (Cons, 2016; Eilenberg, 2012; Harris, 2013; Reeves, 2014; Yeh, 2013). 
In this book I seek to place the borderland city at the centre of analysis 
rather than a component part of frontier polities, regions, or cross-border 
networks.
When it comes to research on Northeast India, cities rarely draw much 
attention despite the rapid growth in the urban population, discussed in 
chapter 2. Imphal is a surprisingly plural city. This may seem like a def ining 
characteristic of any city, anywhere, yet in the Northeast cities are predomi-
nantly conceived as administrative headquarters for whichever ethnic group 
has been granted autonomy over the territory in question. Thus the state 
capital of neighbouring Mizoram, Aizawl, is assumed to be a city inhabited 
by Mizos, and the state capital of neighbouring Nagaland, Kohima, to be 
a city inhabited by Nagas. The Sixth Schedule protecting tribal lands and 
the creation of federal states in the borderland has institutionalised this 
demographic alignment, unlike across the border in Myanmar or in China 
where deliberate trans-migration policies have drastically altered the ethnic 
composition of cities like Lhasa or Myintkyina. In the Northeast ethnic 
plurality is rarely assumed despite the intersecting territories that shape 
the region’s geography. The armed forces, bureaucracy, and the economy of 
counter-insurgency bring migrants to Imphal in large numbers. Manipur 
does not have any restrictions on migration from other parts of India, though 
communities in the hills fall under the Sixth Schedule, theoretically protect-
ing their lands from other communities. Imphal is in the valley not the hills 
and as ‘home’ to the non-tribal Meitei population has no mechanism for 
restricting settlement. Decades of violence in the hill areas and the draw of 
economic and education opportunities in Imphal – whether or not these are 
realised – have brought internal migrants from the hill areas and other parts 
of the valley to the city. Connectivity has increased the f low of people into 
and from Imphal. Far from a Manipuri city in the Manipuri homeland – or 
even more specif ically a Meitei city in the Meitei-inhabited valley, Imphal 
evokes Appadurai’s concept of an ‘ethnoscape’, ‘the landscape of persons 
who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, 
refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals’ 
(1996: 33). Imphal is not a cosmopolitan wonderland like Qatar, Toronto 
or Singapore. Its plurality is relative, however, it is signif icant, given the 
f issures between Manipuris and outsiders and among the different ethnic 
groups indigenous to the state; f issures that play out in Imphal.
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In focusing on belonging and exclusion in Imphal I am interested in 
when ethnicity matters, for whom, and to what ends. Ethnicity in Manipur 
has been shaped by colonial anthropology, particularly the distinction 
between hill and valley communities aligned to tribal hill dwellers and 
non-tribal valley dwellers – a distinction widely critiqued but salient in 
contemporary politics (see Jilangamba, 2015). Thus while there is potential 
use in discussing these constructions – and many scholars of the region 
spend a great deal of time doing so – in postcolonial Manipur, these cat-
egories have been hardened through constitutional provisions aimed at 
uplifting the lot of tribal communities – primarily the Sixth Schedule – and 
by ethno-nationalist movements seeking ethnically exclusive homelands 
with various institutional structures based on these extant ethnic catego-
ries. Therefore while ethnic divisions in Manipur should not be taken as 
a given, the construction of ethnic difference along three main f issures is 
deeply embedded in the politics, society and economy of Manipur. Work 
that seeks to explore life on the ground must contend with the saliency of 
these categories rather than dismiss the often arbitrary and even absurd 
nature of their creation. All of these communities live in Imphal, and the 
pluralism of the city reveals the moments and sites where ethnic divisions 
break down and where they are hardened. As Brubaker (2006) argues in his 
study of everyday ethnicity in the town of Cluj in Romanian Transylvania, 
‘That ethnicity and nationhood are constructed is a commonplace; how they 
are constructed is seldom specif ied in detail’ (2006: 7, emphasis in original). 
In Imphal spatial divisions between ethnic groups are present – divisions 
marked by ethnic symbols, places of worship, types of dwelling, graff iti, and 
the inhabitants themselves. At f irst glance these divisions are f irm. Yet on 
closer inspection the f irmness dissolves and can even disappear. In fact in 
some parts of the city f irm divisions were never there in the f irst place. At 
other times ethnic boundaries harden leading to exclusion and violence. 
In these times belonging is realised on a smaller scale: the household, the 
neighbourhood, the laishang, church, or mosque.
Approaching Imphal
Research for this book took place from 2011 to 2014 over multiple visits to 
Imphal. In late 2010 I was conducting f ieldwork with migrants from the 
Northeast living in Delhi, a study that itself built on a decade or so of work 
in the borderland (McDuie-Ra, 2012a). During my time living in a Northeast 
enclave in Delhi and visiting migrants working in malls, restaurants, hotels, 
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and call centres it became clear that a large proportion of the young people 
leaving the borderland were leaving Manipur. This was especially true for 
migrants who arrived with few connections, resources, or plans – those 
at the bottom end of the migrant pool. They just needed to get out. Many 
wanted to stay out. They missed home, to be sure, but the prospects of having 
a future there was remote. The place was broken. These kinds of responses 
f it the image generated of Manipur and Imphal city in the national media: 
soldiers, shootings in the street, blockades of burning garbage.
Despite assumptions that Imphal is a Meitei city owing to its history as 
seat of the Meitei kings and its location in the valley, throughout my time in 
Delhi I continually met members of various tribal communities who called 
Imphal home. Some were born there, others moved there at a young age to 
follow their parents who went for work. Others went for their secondary 
schooling or on various scholarships. This raised questions that I couldn’t 
let go: what was life like in the city for members of these different com-
munities apparently locked in ferocious interethnic politics of exclusion? 
Did members of these communities get along? Does ethnicity even matter 
in Imphal? Moreover, what was everyday life like in a place so many were 
determined to leave?
In late 2010 there was a rumour going around among friends from 
Manipur living in Delhi; restrictions on foreign access to Imphal were to 
be lifted. I had been waiting for almost ten years for this news and it was 
hard to concentrate on the research I was doing in Delhi. Imphal was call-
ing. However, the news was very hard to verify. Further, Manipur had just 
experienced a ninety-day blockade that had inf lamed tensions between 
Meitei and Naga communities. It seemed unlikely that this would be the 
time to lift restrictions on foreign visitors. Friends from Manipur were also 
sceptical. Some thought it was a mistake. Some thought that if I set out for 
Imphal I would be turned back upon arrival. I went to Manipur Bhawan 
in Delhi, the state ‘house’, to ask if the rumours were true. The guards out 
the front were dubious that I had legitimate business inside but relented, 
perhaps for the novelty. Once inside no one was very sure who could answer 
my question. I was sent to various rooms in poorly lit maze of small rooms 
to meet baff led bureaucrats. Finally a beaming staff member located me 
with a photocopy of what looked like an off icial facsimile that stated that 
from January 1, 2011, restrictions on foreign entry would be lifted for a trial 
period. The staff member warned me that many of the off icials in Manipur 
might not know there has been a change so I had better take a copy of the 
page with me. In February 2011 I arrived in Imphal for the f irst time and 
returned every few months through to the end of 2014.
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My approach to the research began with a more or less conventional 
ethnography based on engaging with people’s daily lives: accompanying 
friends on their trips around the city on errands, to markets, festivals, 
weddings, to visit relatives, and having conversations at each turn. These 
friends would pass me onto other people they knew who had an inter-
est in whatever I was pursuing whether illegal settlements, skateboarder 
hangouts, abandoned development projects, or new apartment blocks. 
Through this organic low key sampling I was able to learn more about a 
particular statue, neighbourhood, street, ritual, and narrow my focus to 
particular spaces and particular f lows and explore these in more depth 
through targeted interviews with key informants along with continuing 
informal conversations with anyone willing.
I began f ield research with a very simple question: what has changed? 
This usually led people to discuss material changes: new houses, demolished 
shops, a new bridge, an abandoned school, more rubbish, or fewer trees. 
Respondents would then explain the causes of these changes and through 
these conversations I was able to gauge who was building big houses, 
who was settling in makeshift slums, where students from a particular 
neighbourhood were now going to school and what it cost and how parents 
managed to pay. I would be invited to follow people to see old rice mills, 
new malls, construction sites, weaving factories, and attend rallies. Asking 
about change also invited residents to talk about their fears, hopes, pride, 
and ways of making do.
Alongside gaining material from people I also gained material from 
reading the urban landscape – the material and symbolic dimensions of 
space and the dynamics that shape it. Lefebvre’s (1991) dialectical approach 
to the production of space is a useful starting point. For Lefebvre, the urban 
is a level between everyday life and the existing order – and in the case of 
Imphal this order is shaped within and beyond the borderland, Lefebvre’s 
‘near order’ and ‘far order’ (Kipfer et al., 2013: 124). The urban is a space of 
‘encounter, assembly, simultaneity’ (Lefebvre, 1979/2003: 118). It needs to 
be understood as a social force and the product of social forces produced 
through three connected dialectical processes (or ‘moments’): spatial 
practice or perceived space, representations of space or conceived space, 
and spatial representations or lived space (Lefebvre, 1991: 33-42). The f irst 
process refers to material structures ref lecting the spatial manifestations 
of social and political power, the second is the abstraction of this power 
as ideology, knowledge and language used for domination, the third is the 
space of everyday experience where material and abstract power are lived. 
These three moments are of equal value and enable analysis of the material 
30  BORDERLAND CIT Y IN NEW INDIA 
and symbolic elements of space, how they are produced, challenged, and 
experienced. As he notes in the Production de L’space, ‘In reality, social 
space “incorporates” social actions, the actions of subjects both individual 
and collective who are born and who die, who suffer and who act’ (1991: 
33). In Imphal this approach reveals the material, ideological, and lived 
experience of sovereign power produced by state, quasi-state and non-state 
actors and the ways this is marked on the landscape, on the built and natural 
environment.
To explore this – along with encounters with the people of Imphal – I 
paid particular attention to the landscape. I focused on: (i) billboards: which 
indicated what was being marketed and the symbols and images being 
used, (ii) posters: mostly glued onto walls and electricity poles announcing 
events from rock concerts to political meetings, (iii) public service an-
nouncements: including those from both state and non-state actors usually 
painted onto walls directly or printed on paper and displayed in shops and 
other businesses, (iv) graff iti: including political slogans, symbols and text 
marking underground territory, and street art, (v) memorials: including 
off icial statues of Indian f igures and local nationalist heroes, war memori-
als, memorials to killed members of the armed forces, and killed members 
of underground groups, (vi) public buildings: from army headquarters to 
showcase public works, (vii) houses: new and old, big and small, traditional 
and contemporary dwellings, (viii) neighbourhoods: who lives in them, who 
patrols them, who marks them with their territorial claims, (ix) places of 
worship, (x) markets; mobile and permanent, illegal and legal, indoor and 
outdoor, and (xi) f ields, forests, groves, ponds, and rivers in various states 
of ruin and rejuvenation. I took thousands of photographs of the landscape 
and shared these with friends and acquaintances who would interpret 
what they thought I had captured. Locals would also take photographs and 
share them with me, whether on their phones, by email, or from their own 
collections. Through this ongoing exchange (which continues through the 
writing of this book) I was able to build additional narratives of the city; an 
additional script to the things I witnessed in person. This combined with 
interviews and conversations forms the ethnographic material used in the 
book. Unlike my previous research where I depended on meeting people, 
I often spent long periods in Imphal alone with the urban landscape, or 
with one or two companions scaling a fence to look into an abandoned lot, 
searching for a rumoured memorial, or hanging out in a hospital cafeteria.
The visual landscape of Imphal is challenging. It can appear chaotic 
and illegible. Imphal has patches that are planned and orderly, and indeed 
a drive to create order is an important part of the city’s development plan 
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(Imphal Municipal Council, 2007). However, most of the material space 
appears haphazard. It is particularly challenging to read the appearance of 
chaos without reproducing its inferences. Here King’s approach to reading 
urban space is useful in f inding ways to dissect what appears impenetrable. 
King focuses on juxtapositions – namely attention to the positioning ‘of the 
dissimilar and even the incompatible’, superimpositions – what he calls 
‘activities piled on activities, screens on screens’, and chaos itself which 
‘needs to be seen as a medium for resilience and survival, more rarely also 
for resistance’ (2011: 12). These three concepts draw attention to the ways 
space is appropriated, off icially and unoff icially, temporarily and more 
permanently, all of which drive change in Imphal reflecting past and present 
conf igurations of power and their accompanying imaginations.
Sense also plays an important role in the articulation and demarcation of 
space in Imphal (see Low, 2013). In Imphal attempts to articulate and enforce 
acceptable sensory behaviour characterise relationships between: (i) tribals 
and non-tribals based on the food different communities cook and eat, the 
smell of illegal distilleries, the noise from religious worship and festivals, (ii) 
between different class groups, for example poorer areas are perceived as 
smelly by some urban residents because of the rubbish, the industry (metal 
works, incineration, animal slaughter), and noise owing to overcrowded 
dwellings and raucous behaviour often linked to rural sensibilities and 
alcohol consumption, while wealthier areas are imagined as quiet, odour 
free, and clean, (iii) between residents and the authorities, for instance, 
sensory disturbances are taken as indicators of ineffective urban govern-
ance and thus the smell of burning garbage and polluted watercourses, the 
noise and pollution of heavy vehicle traff ic, and the aesthetic breaches of 
the built environment contribute to the perceptions of civilian authorities 
as corrupt, inept, or incapable.
Structure of the Book
The book is divided into two parts. Part one, Disturbed City, Sensitive Space 
explores the microsites of control and contention in Imphal through three 
chapters. Chapter 2, Belonging focuses on plurality, polarity, and neighbour-
hoods to sketch the different ways residents of Imphal maintain a sense of 
place in the disturbed city. I consider the more obvious ways of belonging, 
such as ethnicity, and alternatives, from sports to illicit eating and drinking. 
Chapter 3, Control is concerned with the control of urban space in Imphal 
and the ways this is contested. The f irst part of this chapter examines the 
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armed forces, who control parts of the city by enacting security, and the 
civilian government, who control parts of the city through development 
projects and attempts to order urban chaos. The relationship between the 
armed forces and the civilian government is rarely seamless making it 
diff icult to locate a singular hegemonic force in control of space in the 
city. The second part uses the example of memorials around the city to 
demonstrate the ways in which spatial control is contested by residents; 
a challenging task in the disturbed city. This tentative counter-hegemony 
reveals the small acts residents take to mark the landscape with memories 
of violence, loss, and def iance. Chapter 4, Exclusion shifts emphasis to the 
interethnic politics that play out in the city. Imphal is cast as an arena within 
which the territorial politics of hill and valley/tribal and non-tribal play 
out. Any notion of unif ied counter-hegemony is fragmented during periods 
of intense interethnic tensions, as during the blockades of the city in 2010 
and 2011, when exclusion and belonging are negotiated through struggles 
among the population with the armed forces and civilian government 
as bystanders and occasional interveners. A much larger movement to 
exclude non-Manipuris from the city, and the state, in 2012-14 subsumed 
interethnic tensions and cast all Manipuris as indigenous peoples united in 
their precarious geographic and demographic circumstances at the edge of 
the Indian state. The movement seeks the implementation of the Inner-Line 
Permit system or ILP, a mechanism for restricting entry and monitoring 
the presence of non-Manipuris in the state. Once again Imphal is the arena 
where this plays out.
Part two, Liberalising the Frontier considers the ways in which inward 
and outward connectivity to India and to Southeast Asia shape parts of 
the disturbed city and vice versa. Chapter 5, Gateway City analyses the 
recalibration of Imphal as a gateway to Southeast Asia. Imphal is subject 
to vigorous bureaucratic imaginings as the gateway to a zone of potential 
where cross-border f lows of goods and people will produce economic 
opportunities and diplomatic gestures with neighbouring countries will 
legitimise the borderland as part of India. This chapter discusses the cam-
paign for Meitei Mayek script on all visible signage, the clothing trade, and 
the ASEAN car rally to demonstrate the unexpected opportunities and 
controversies of connectivity. Chapter 6, Health City uses the name given 
to celebrate the concentration of high-quality private health facilities in 
the city and investigates how world-class health facilities can exist in such 
a tumultuous polity. The poor conditions of the public hospitals as well as 
demand from patients across the border in Myanmar and other parts of the 
borderland have led to a thriving private hospital system driven by health 
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entrepreneurs – mostly return migrants or defectors from the public system. 
This has produced alternative ways of enabling movement mobility across 
the border for patients that bypass Indian authorities. The boom in private 
healthcare has also transformed the landscape on the northern edge of the 
city and created new battles over land between settlers who moved into the 
peri-urban fringe in the 1990s escaping conf lict and a new class of medical 
and other professionals seeking land and entrepreneurs seeking to build 
new facilities. Chapter 7, Education City analyses the private education 
boom taking place in the city fuelled by demand from parents and their 
children to gain qualif ications to travel west for further education or work in 
other parts of India, a renewed possibility in light of better connectivity. The 
boom is also fuelled by the utter dysfunction of the public school system. 
New schools are extending the boundaries of the city in the southwest and 
diminishing the size of smallholder farmland on the peri-urban fringe. 
The cost of private schooling also affects the landscape as families in the 
hills sell land and timber to send their children to the education city. This 
is a kind of accidental liberalisation, which, as with the health sector, was 
born out of necessity, has become the norm and attests to the uniqueness 
of liberalisation in the disturbed city.
Terminology and Place Names
In this book I use off icial names for landmarks, wards and neighbourhoods 
in the city. Some parts of the city have alternative names, but these are 
only noted if they add something to the material being discussed. Only 
main roads have names, and where it is relevant I have used these names. 
Neighbourhood streets and laneways rarely have names. Where possible I 
use English language terms to describe various spaces, objects, and types of 
terrain – the exceptions are terms with no clear English language equivalent 
and in these cases I use the local term and have done my best to explain 
the term at f irst usage and have provided a glossary.
I use the term ‘tribal’ to refer to communities that fall under the Sixth 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which applies to 33 groups in Manipur. 
The term is Imperial, denotes backwardness, and is selectively applied 
(Barbora, 2008; De, 2014; Jilangamba, 2015; Karlsson, 2001, 2003; Xaxa, 1999). 
However, it is used by communities subject to the term, by the Indian Gov-
ernment and Manipur Government to govern these groups, and is a major 
determinant of rights claims for these communities. The term ‘tribal’ can 
create confusion given its use to identify tribal communities from central 
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India, referred to in Hindi as adivasis. Adivasis are not related to Northeast 
tribals ethnically nor have they had a great deal of historical contact, and 
adivasis fall under a different constitutional provision (the Fifth Schedule). 
The term ‘tribal’ or adivasi is often considered pejorative when referring to 
these communities, denoting a position outside the caste system and the 
bounds of civility, whereas in the Northeast the term is internalised and 
a source of pride, akin to being identif ied as indigenous and being able to 
make claims on the state for reservations in education and employment, 
protection of ancestral lands, and recognition of traditional authority (see 
Van Schendel, 2011).
Tensions between tribals and the Manipur Government, which is per-
ceived to represent the interests of the Meitei majority, are a crucial element 
of contemporary politics. Despite these tensions the category tribal is rarely 
questioned. In fact, there are members of the non-tribal Meitei community 
seeking inclusion in the Sixth Schedule as tribes, in part as a response to 
the supposedly unfair advantages to which tribal communities are entitled. 
They have an active organisation, the Scheduled Tribes Demand Committee 
of Manipur Valley, which even met with former Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh in 2012. The Committee claims that extending the Sixth Schedule to 
Meiteis will better integrate the hill and valley communities of Manipur, 
that Meiteis still maintain animist traditions despite mass conversion to 
Hinduism (this is not an outrageous claim given the extent of revivalism 
of the pre-Hindu Sanamahi religion), and that tribal and non-tribal com-
munities share racial lineage as Tibeto-Burman peoples. Yet as Piang argues 
(2014), the irony of the claim for Scheduled Tribe status is that it comes 
mostly from the upper-caste Meiteis, the dwija, or twice born, who have 
historically exercised a high level of prejudice towards tribal communities. 
Piang adds, ‘after more than 65 years of independence, the forward classes 
of society are demanding the status of “backward classes”’. What is interest-
ing about the claim is that it ref lects the view that tribals have too many 
advantages from aff irmative action policies and that in the contemporary 
era they are no longer disadvantaged vis-à-vis the non-tribal population; 
a view regularly voiced by Meiteis in Imphal during f ieldwork. Yet tribals 
will counter with the opposite view, that they experience disadvantage 
when compared to the more populous Meitei who hold the majority of 
seats in the assembly, the majority of high-level government posts, and 
control a larger share of the economy. The important point here is that the 
tribal status is desired not shunned and thus I will use it in a similar way 
throughout the book.
INTRODUC TION 35
The two main tribal groups are the Naga and Kuki. These are not perfect 
amalgams and many smaller tribal communities resist incorporation into 
these larger groups. This means that sizeable communities like Hmar, 
Paite, and Vaiphei that do not always willingly yield to inclusion in the 
amalgamated categories are mostly invisible. However, for the sake of clarity 
I will use these umbrella terms in this book except where it is necessary to 
identify a more specif ic community.
I will use the term Meitei to refer to members of the Meitei ethnic group. 
I don’t wish to suggest the Meitei population is homogenous, nor do I wish 
to suggest that the Naga or Kuki communities are either, and intra-ethnic 
distinctions will become clear during the course of the book. At various 
points I will use the term Manipuri to refer to all of the ‘indigenous’ peoples 
of the state; namely Nagas, Kuki, all other tribal communities, and Meiteis 
as well as the Pangal community of Meitei Muslims. Manipuri is a tricky 
term because it is often used to refer to the Meitei ethnic group only. In this 
book I will be using it to discuss politics of migration and the distinction 
made between Manipuri and non-Manipuri people. Indigenous is used in 
some of the campaigns against migration, and it usually includes Meitei, 
Naga, Kuki, and other tribal communities and thus I will use it from time 
to time when discussing this campaign, especially in chapter 4.
Finding a term for the non-Manipuri population is a little more dif-
f icult. There are many people in Manipur, and Imphal especially, who have 
migrated from outside the state. Signif icant numbers have f led conf licts 
in neighbouring parts of the borderland and settled in Imphal, including 
from Mizoram, Nagaland, and Myanmar. These latter communities blend 
into the tribal population and are tolerated, more or less. Those who have 
migrated from other parts of India, Nepal, and Bangladesh are much more 
visible as outsiders, even those born in Manipur, and the term non-Manipuri 
is usually used to refer to these communities. The word mayang in Meiteilon 
(the Meitei language) is commonly used to refer to non-Manipuris in Imphal, 
though there are different words in tribal languages. Given this divergence 
I will use the term non-Manipuri in this book for the most part. I also prefer 
to use non-Manipuri as its use has forced consideration of the boundaries 
of being a Manipuri; an important component of the dynamics of belonging 
and exclusion that plays out in the city. In sum, I recognise the limits of all 
these terms, however, the terms have currency on the ground, in institu-
tions, and in the public sphere. Given the contentious nature of most things 
in Imphal I have used pseudonyms for all of the people quoted or referred 
to in the text. The only exceptions are in quoting politicians or other public 
f igures from statements they have made in the press or on the public record.
